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Belgian State Reform in 2009: 
A year of mounting pressure 
Carl Devos and Nicolas Bouteca  
At last! In 2010 we should finally have a solution for BHV (Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde) , the ‘black 
hole’ of Belgian politics) and a constitutional reform. Something has got to happen if only 
because the pressure has been building up for years, including throughout 2009. Of course, such 
pressure can also make it more difficult to reach agreement. Let us take a look at the 2009 run-
up to political D-Day in 2010. 
During the federal elections of June 2007 the Flemish Christian-Democratic party (CD&V) 
promised ‘the most definitive constitutional reform ever’. Since those elections, in which the 
cartel of Christian Democrats and moderate Flemish Nationalists (N-VA) were very successful, 
constitutional reform has remained high on the political agenda. But during 2007 and 2008 
agreement between the Flemish and French-speaking communities proved impossible to reach 
and the constitutional issue continued to hang over the Belgian political world like the sword of 
Damocles. Failure to reach agreement and lack of mutual trust also added to the difficulties 
faced by the federal government. So if Belgium is to have a long-term future, some degree of 
reform seems essential.  
Meanwhile, in Flanders pressure for reform is rising and at some point it must find an outlet. 
However, in the view of Jean-Luc Dehaene, one of the architects of the Belgian federal system, 
“definitive constitutional reform is an illusion”. He was Prime Minister in the 1990s and will be 
advising the Leterme government in the spring of 2010 on possible solutions to the problems 
dividing the communities. It is his belief that the institutional architecture of any political system 
can never be definitive, but must constantly adapt to changes in society. Every constitutional 
reform in Belgium has carried within it the seeds of future conflict between the linguistic 
communities. Every reform has been an incomplete, temporary compromise, created by specific 
temporary coalitions in response to the problems of the day. They have not grown out of any 
clear vision of an agreed objective. Furthermore, the French and Flemish communities have a 
different perception of the extent, timing and purpose of constitutional reform. Indeed, there is 
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not even complete agreement within the linguistic communities themselves. So we are still a 
long way from achieving a conclusive settlement, and the shadow of constitutional reform 
continues to lurk disturbingly in the background.  In a bipolar federation, without national 
political parties and without nation-wide media, it is always differences that attract attention. 
They form an inexhaustible source for disputes about the state’s institutions. Constitutional 
reform is the perpetuum mobile of Belgian politics.  
It remains to be seen whether the long-awaited inter-community agreement on reform will be 
achieved in 2010. In any case, during 2009 the pressure for constitutional change intensified 
considerably in Flanders. The BHV issue presentsed an obvious external justification for state 
reform, comparable to the way in which earlier constitutional reform resulted, amongst others, 
from had come about becausepressure caused by  of the financial problems in Francophone 
education.  
In 2009, the results of the regional elections in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels, the subsequent 
government formations and the ups and downs of the Belgian budget show that the issue of 
constitutional reform is very much alive. The question whether the electoral constituency of 
Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) will be split up lies below the surface of Belgian politics like a 
ticking time bomb and has made further negotiations about inter-community relations 
inevitable1. They will take place in 2010. In this article we shall consider what happened in 2009 
in the run-up to those negotiations.  
                                                          
1
 The debate surrounding BHV has its roots in the 1960s but until 2003 it was a purely political problem 
that only interested a few Flemish politicians. BHV is an electoral constituency for federal and European 
elections which is unique in that it extends across two linguistic areas: the 19 bilingual municipalities of 
Brussels and the 35 Flemish municipalities of Halle-Vilvoorde, a part of the province of Flemish Brabant. 
The numerous French speakers in the Flemish suburbs are thereby able to vote for the same Francophone 
parties as Francophones in Brussels. They are the only voters in Belgium that can vote across the language 
border that divides the unilingual Flanders from the bilingual Brussels and unilingual Wallonia. This has 
given rise to much ill-feeling. In the first place, the Flemish parties consider BHV to be a hindrance to the 
integration of French speakers in Flanders. Secondly, they regard its very existence as evidence of 
Francophone imperialism. For whenever there are federal or European elections, Belgium’s bilingual 
district bursts its banks and the linguistic frontier shifts dozens of kilometres into the Flemish hinterland. 
In 2003 BHV also became a legal problem when the Constitutional Court decided that the new electoral 
law of 2002 was unconstitutional because provincial constituencies had been created to replace the 
former district constituencies everywhere except in Flemish Brabant (which completely surrounds 
Brussels). Candidates from Flemish Brabant Halle-Vilvoorde were therefore treated differently from 
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The 2009 Flemish elections  
On 7 June 2009 the former partners in the now defunct ‘Flemish cartel’, the Flemish Christian 
Democrats (CD&V) and the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), won the Flemish elections. Together 
they received 36% of the votes, an increase of 9.9% (dit moet zijn procentpunt, maar ik vind 
daar geen vertaling van) on their score in 2004 and 6.4% (idem) more than in the federal 
elections of 2007. Particularly striking was the high level of support for the moderate 
nationalists, the N-VA. As an offshoot of the disbanded regionalist party Volksunie People’s 
Union(partijnamen niet vertalen)  in 2003, this was its first campaign since the federal elections 
of 2003 – the cartel with CD&V was formed in 2004 - as an independent party and it attracted 
13.1% of the votes and gained 16 seats in the Flemish parliament.  In contrast, the liberal Open 
VLD, the social democratic SP.a and the far right-wing, separatist Vlaams Belang all suffered 
losses, ending up with about 15% of the vote. The right-wing liberal LDD got only 7.6%, well 
below what was expected, and the ecological party Groen! with 6.8% did not manage to gain 
any advantage from the hype surrounding Jean-Michel Javaux, the President of the 
Francophone Ecolo, who generated a green tsunami in French-speaking Belgium. The degree of 
support for the Christian Democrats, Nationalists (from N-VA and  Vlaams Belang) and 
LDDLiberals, all of whom explicitly campaigned for far-reaching constitutional reforms, was 
interpreted by some commentators as a powerful signal from the Flemish electorate that radical 
constitutional change was needed. The same conclusion was drawn after the federal elections of 
2007.  
According to the N-VA’s leading light, Flemish Minister Geert Bourgeois, their electoral success 
revived ‘humanitarian’ Flemish nationalism. No longer would Flemish nationalism automatically 
                                                                                                                                                                            
candidates in other provinces in violation of the constitutional principle of equal treatment. They, unlike 
all other candidates in all other provincial constituencies, had to compete with voters outside their own 
province (namely in Brussels). The Constitutional Court ruled that the combination of BHV with provincial 
constituencies elsewhere had to go, otherwise the Federal elections would no longer be legal. The 
judgment was circumvented in 2007 by bringing forward the elections, but any federal elections after 
2007 will be illegal unless the BHV issue is resolved. The Flemish parties regard the judgement as 
vindicating their demand that the existing constituency be broken up. The Francophone parties stress that 
the Court has not ordered the break-up of the constituency and consider that a return to the old district 
electoral system is the best solution. They will only agree to the break-up of BHV in exchange for large 
concessions by the Flemish. It is the terms of that exchange, the break-up of BHV for concessions to the 
Francophone community, which must be agreed in 2010.  
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be identified with the extreme right. Although inter-community issues seemed to vanish during 
the regional campaign, they resurfaced prominently on the evening of election day during a final 
televised debate between the party leaders. It was then that the electoral result was interpreted 
as a ‘signal’ from the voters that the CD&V and N-VA now had a popular mandate to push for 
constitutional reform.  
The community debate dominated the day following the elections. This was somewhat 
unexpected because during the campaign the economic crisis had attracted most attention and 
hardly anything was said about constitutional reform. Apart from some spluttering from the N-
VA about the regional, linguistic communities issues-, it was the silence that was most striking. 
Even in Christian-Democratic circles, where the failure of inter-community negotiations after the 
2007 federal elections had caused great dissatisfaction, it was scarcely mentioned. Presumably 
so as not to remind voters that the grand promises of 2007 had all come to nothing. 
Furthermore, at the end of 2008, the Christian Democrats’ front-runner, the then outgoing and 
now current Minister-President of Flanders, Kris Peeters, had claimed credit for having inspired 
the dialogue between the Flemish and French-speaking Ccommunities. But in the end that too 
failed. During the previous election campaign of 2007 there had also been very little debate on 
constitutional reform, but it was obvious that the CD-V / N-VA cartel had already agreed their 
agenda on the communities. However, this was much less apparent during the regional 
elections of 2009. Nevertheless, since 2007 the question of constitutional reform has never 
disappeared and in 2009 it was once again deliberately pushed to centre stage. But only after 
the regional elections.  
Forming the Flemish government  
 
The formation of the Flemish government in mid-2009 was a further contributory factor in the 
drive for constitutional reform. Simply by virtue of its make-up, the Peeters cabinet provided 
extra momentum because of the pressure generated by the different composition of the 
Flemish and federal government.imbalance between the regional and federal governments. 
Both are coalitions headed by the Christian Democrats. However, the liberals are their partners 
at the Federal level, but are in opposition in Flanders. Conversely the nationalist N-VA and the 
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socialist SP.a are coalition partners of the Christian Democrats in Flanders, but are in opposition 
to the federal government led by the Christian-Democratic Prime Minister Leterme.  
In such a political asymmetric configuration potential conflicts between the linguistic 
communities are more difficult to smooth out or calm down because the two levels of 
government are only connected through a single party, the Christian Democrats. This is not 
enough to prevent the interests of the two governments from diverging since their interests are 
ultimately dictated by party politics. Indeed iIn the past, too, thisit had led to serious tensions 
between the federal and community levels. In 2004 wWhen the Christian Democrats, in 2004,  
included the immediate breakup of BHV in their regional coalition agreement, they indirectly 
placed a bomb under the federal coalition of socialists and liberals. For splitting up BHV involves 
electoral law and is therefore a federal responsibility. At that time, CD&V was not part of the 
federal government. In 2004, Tthe Flemish Christian Democrats no longer felt any great sense of 
loyalty towards the French-speaking community after breaking the links with their Francophone 
sister party. Furthermore, placing the issue on the political agenda was an ideal way of tripping 
up the ‘purple’ federal government. At the time, the Flemish Liberal Democrats (Open VLD) and 
Socialists (SP.a) were partners in  Verhofstadt’s second federal government, but were 
nevertheless anxious not to be seen as hostile to Flemish interests. So they too promised that 
BHV would be split up and in 2005 the Verhofstadt government attempted to push it through. It 
was unsuccessful. Then in 2007, the Christian Democrats promised their electors that it could 
succeed where others had failed by using the Flemish majority to push through the legislation 
against the wishes of the French-speaking minority. However, the Francophones were able to 
exploit all kinds of institutional veto mechanisms to obstruct the proposed legislation and the 
affair dragged on into 2009. After the regional elections of 2009, though, the issue of BHV once 
again took centre stage.  
In particular, it hit the headlines in the summer of 2009 when the leader of the moderate 
Flemish nationalists (N-VA) De Wever declared that the so-called Maddens doctrine was the 
preferred way to resolve the community question. According to this ‘doctrine’, named after a 
Flemish political scientist, Flanders should withhold its contributions to the Federal government 
until the relatively poorer southern provinces which depend on federal subsidies are forced to 
demand constitutional reform. De Wever’s remarkable suggestion, a few days after the Flemish 
elections, that the federal state Belgium should be put into receivership aroused a great deal of 
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criticism, even among Christian Democrats who head the federal government against which the 
N-VA is in opposition.  
Furthermore, the agreement between the Flemish coalition parties states that the Flemish 
government will pursue strong and assertive Flemish policies. It insists on wide-ranging 
constitutional reform and the dismantling of BHV, on which there can be no compromise. The 
Christian Democrats who head both the Federal and Flemish governments have signed up to 
this agreement. It is also agreed that the  Flemish government will interpret its powers as widely 
as possible – for instance by creating a supplementary social security system for Flanders – and 
will no longer set funds aside to help with the Federal budget.  
In addition, the Flemish government will implement a policy to strengthen the Flemish character 
of the so-called ‘Vlaamse Rand’, the environs of Brussels which lie in Flanders, and insist on the 
respect for observation of the language laws in the city and its suburbs. The European 
agreement on minorities will not be ratified and will therefore not be included in any general 
agreement on constitutional reform. Meanwhile, the Flemish Parliament passed a regional 
decree to bring the inspection of French-speaking schools (which are paid for by Flanders)in 
Flemish municipalities (which are paid for by Flanders) within the competence of the Flemish 
authorities. French speakers have reacted strongly to this. The decree will compromise 
negotiations on BHV, they say.  
Francophone reactions to the Flemish coalition agreement in general have been extremely 
critical. Especially the sections proposing supplementary child benefit and hospital insurance in 
Flanders have met with considerable opposition in the south of the country because it is feared 
that it could undermine federal social security provision. For the Francophone parties this is as 
much of a no-go area as moving the language boundary is for Flemish politicians. To 
Francophones, tinkering with the social security system is to interfere with the very foundations 
of the federal state and to propose any change is regarded as provocation. Community relations 
have been further soured by the continued refusal of the Flemish government to ratify the 
appointment of three Francophone burgomasters mayors who were elected in 2006 by the 
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Flemish municipalities with ‘linguistic facilities’2. It has created much bad blood within the 
French-speaking community and their official appointment by the Flemish government has been 
made one of the preconditions for any breaking up of BHV in 2010. That too has contributed to 
the build-up of conflict during 2009.  
French-speaking Belgium was dismayed by the plans of Kris Peeters and his ministers. A 
specifically Flemish supplementary child allowance or hospital insurance was seen as an attack 
on ‘interpersonal solidarity’. “A child is a child. It is unacceptable that a distinction should be 
made between a child from the north and a child from the south”, said Cathérine Fonck the 
Christian Democratic minister responsible for children’s welfare in the Francophone community. 
In Flanders, on the other hand, there seems, strangely enough, to be some degree of consensus 
on the coalition’s proposals. The socialist SP.a, a party which in 1999 voted against one of the 
Flemish parliament’s famous five resolutions because it involved regionalising family allowances 
and health insurance, is now fully behind the proposals. Even Jan Renders, leader of the Flemish 
Christian trade union and therefore a descendent of the founding fathers of the Belgian social 
model, has not rejected a Flemish system of hospital insurance out of hand. This could portend 
an important development in the debate on regionalising social security.  
Nevertheless, there is still internal disagreement on the precise range and concrete implications 
of the Maddens doctrine, despite a degree of consensus on the development of a separate 
Flemish care system and the assertive stance  of the Flemish government. The Christian 
Democrats, for instance, do not want to go down the ‘conflict of interest’ route too often to 
obstruct federal measures such as the budget. Their party is, after all, the leading member of 
the federal government and they are clearly uncomfortable about allowing the federal budget 
to erode merely to force French-speaking Belgium to demand reforms.  
The Budget 
In 2009, it was not only the Flemish elections and subsequent cabinet formation, but also in 
particular the argument over the budgetary contributions of the different governments that 
                                                          
2
  Because in 2006 they failed to accept the Flemish interpretation of the language legislation and refused 
to post the polling cards first in Flemish, the Flemish government will not officially appoint them as mayor. 
Today they remain, as it were, temporarily in office, a situation that could drag on for a long time.  
 8 
showed that constitutional reform was inevitable. Agreement was reached on the distribution of 
the budgetary burden up to 2012, whereby Flanders would pay more than its fair share so that 
by 2015 all the governments would again reach a budget in balance ary parity at the Belgian 
level. The Flemish government said has let it be known on several occasions that any surpluses it 
might collect after 2012 will not be set aside to support the federal budget, but will be used to 
fund Flemish policies. That seems to be a certain recipe for inter-community conflict.  
There is another issue that makes linking the budget and constitutional reform inevitable. The 
financial position of the federal government is simply untenable. The federal government is 
unable to hold on to enough of its income to function properly because it faces has to service 
the rising cost of past debts, pay ever-larger sums of money to the regions, and support the 
increasingly expensive social security system from general funds. The federal government has to 
bear 90% of the spiralling costs of an aging population and is already structurally underfinanced. 
A possible solution would be for the regions to take on a greater share of the cost of aging by 
paying the pensions of their own civil servants. It should also be possible to reduce the regional 
subsidies from the federal treasury or even to transfer responsibilities competences to the 
regions without funding them. In this way the poverty stricken federal government might be 
able to create some financial breathing space for itself.  
 
 
BHV 
Finally, back to where we started: BHV. Nobody expects an institutional big bang before the 
federal elections of 2011. The lengthy procedures for resolving conflicts of interest over BHV run 
out in March 2010 and then it could come down to a straight vote between Flanders and 
French-speaking Belgium in the Federal parliament. This could presumably result in the fall of 
the government. After Prime Minister Van Rompuy became President of the EU in November 
2009, the new Leterme government agreed on the negotiating procedures for BHV. Ex-Prime 
Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, who is very experienced in resolving complex inter-community 
problems, has been asked to come up with some solutions for BHV by Easter 2010. After that a 
committee consisting of the party leaders and Prime Minister Leterme will conclude the 
negotiations.  
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The BHV issue might very well lead to a ‘mini’ constitutional reform. Bearing in mind the Belgian 
consensus model, one might speculate that it could will be settled within some kind of package 
deal, as is the tradition in Belgian state reform. After the usual game of give and take, a deal on 
BHV could will be buried inside a wider agreement whereby in exchange for dismantling it, 
concessions will be made to the French-speaking community, allowing all parties to leave the 
table as ‘winners’.  
These might include finding some extra money for the Brussels region, whose finances are 
currently on the rocks, and finally confirming the appointment of the three Francophone mayors 
in the Flemish suburbs. They might include extending the French community’s powers in the 
Flemish municipalities with facilities for French speakers, relaxing the language laws in Brussels 
or being more flexible about the right of French speakers in the Flemish environs of Brussels to 
register for elections in the city and cast their votes there. Probably a few minor agreements 
(the famous ‘cocktail snacks’) which were agreed in 2008 will be included in any BHV deal. These 
involved among other things the regionalisation of a number of insignificant powers, measures 
to strengthen the federation and extra funding for Brussels. So some minor constitutional 
changes can be expected. Meanwhile, during the transition to the Leterme government in 
November 2009, an agreement was reached on what negotiation method should be used. 
In contrast to the declarations after the Flemish elections in June 2009, Prime Minister 
Leterme’s policy statement in November 2009 was unambiguously in favour of finding a fair 
solution. He also distanced himself from the tough statements he had made in 2007 when he 
demanded that BHV be “split up without concessions”. Nevertheless, even if the communities 
reach agreement on BHV in 2010, it will still not resolve the untenable financial position of the 
federal government. Those negotiations will have to wait until after the federal elections of 
2011, assuming that the Leterme II cabinet survives that long.  
A striking feature of the present debate about constitutional reform is the reversal in the 
motives underpinning federalism. In the past, Flanders fought for greater autonomy in the 
pursuit of cultural emancipation for Belgium’s Dutch speakers. The Walloons for their part 
hoped that self-government would revive their faltering economy. Constitutional reforms in the 
past were pushed through solely with the idea of helping the regions and making them more 
self-sufficient.  But in 2009 it became clear, partly because of the global economic crisis, that the 
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structure of the state itself would have to be modified if the federal government is to keep its 
head above water.  
There are already many who assume that Belgium will evolve into a confederation. Whereas in 
the past, one tried to justify the existence of the regions, nowadays one wonders what purpose 
the federal government serves.  By law, every government in Belgium is supposed to be equal, 
but in the current debate on constitutional reform it appears that the federal government can 
now only survive by the grace of the regions. Constitutional reform has turned Belgium from a 
unitary state into a federal state. The question now is whether the never-ending story of 
constitutional change will lead on to confederalism.  In 2009, the pressure for finding a deal on 
BHV in 2010 and an agreement on the reform of the state in 2011 was increased considerably. 
At the beginning of 2010, the president of Flemish liberal party, a coalition party of the federal 
government, repeated that he would not except anything else but a true solution of BHV that 
would definitely remove BHV from the political agenda. According to this newly elected 
president, who made credibility his trademark, his party would not except any kind of 
emergency law that would not solve the BHV question but would sail around the legal obstacles 
against federal elections as formulated by the Constitutional  Court.  
Not only the credibility of one party is at stake, but the credibility and stability of the whole of 
the Belgian system. Including its renowned skills of consensus building and conflict resolution. 
 
 
Translated by Chris Emery 
Met opmaak: Engels (V.S.)
